Why do we want to emphasize the distinction between the “Beijing regime” and the “Chinese people?” 为什么我们要强调区分“北京政权”和“中国人”

编者按:我们翻译这篇文章的目的是提醒一个始终存在的却被有意忽略的事实,即在海外的中国留学生中部分人的确有着爱国但不爱政府的立场,就如这篇文章中所指出的那样,但这件事始终少有人认可,尤其是不被中国人认可。这个话题在中国长期以来存在矛盾,而这些学生被贴上了“小粉红”的标签,被很多中国人所鄙视,被澳大利亚当地视为共产党的间谍来排斥,这就是为什么你看不到他们,或者看不清。

几年前曾经有在澳洲读书的中国异议学生说过这样的话,“我们这边的华裔小粉红比很多海外民运人士有着更出色的认知”。我当时没有能理解这句话,后来才知道,这里所指的“小粉红”就是那些爱自己的家园但不认同政权的留学生。

我们可以不谈论国家这个政治概念,我们说家园,离乡背井的人对家园故土的感情是否合理众所周知,同时只要有最基本的道德感的人都会鄙视这个作恶多端的政权,两者丝毫不会矛盾。政府不等于国家,爱家园不等于爱政府,公民不会被政权绑架,这都是基本常识,然而这个问题在中国却难以说清。

我们认为这篇文章没能完全讲明白这个问题,于是在编者按中佐以补充。然而令人困惑的是,我们事实上花了很长时间去思考是否有必要翻译这篇文章,准确说是问我们自己是否有勇气说出事实。这是我们的焦虑所在,一直以来这个问题经常会出现,即一篇文章、一个观点,我们会首先考虑中文读者是否能接受,作为是否翻译它的基本条件,然而我们也明白,中文读者容易接受的观点势必已经存在于普遍的既有认知之内,换句话说就是,对开阔眼界和丰富认知的目的来说,相比下效用较低。而正是那些不易被接受的观点才是通往信息自由的路径,激发思考的引擎。

“这是我的国家,但那个人不是我的总统”,很多美国公民都会说这句话,部分中国的海外留学生在北京当局修宪之后也加入了这样的运动,他们贴出了海报:“那不是我的主席”。这些年轻人是未来反抗的源泉,而他们的反抗将建立在热爱这片土地的基础上 —— “那是我的家园,我不会允许邪恶的权力霸占它”,而不是“那个国家应该被摧毁,它一文不值”。而后者是为数不少的华裔移民和中国国内移民爱好者的共识。如果可以选择,你认为上述哪个群体更有希望成就未来的反抗力量?

毫无疑问。

曾经有西方媒体朋友说:我们不应该含糊地标注“中国”和“中国人”,或者说“北京政权”和“中国人”,我非常感动,这意味着承认中国人不都是政权的拥护者,民间仍存在反威权的意识。并且后来我逐渐发现,这是一个很严肃的问题,而不仅仅是感动足够回应的。

心理学称之为组块思维,就如中国人在谈论美国时把华盛顿和美国社会、左翼和右翼、独立民间组织和政府资助的组织,混为一谈;美国人在谈论俄罗斯时把反抗者和克里姆林宫混为一谈。这也是我们翻译俄罗斯NGO那篇文章的原因之一,很多美国大型资助者已经撤回了资金,而不顾俄罗斯反抗者的无畏努力和资源匮乏的处境,这是建立在地缘政治层面上的态度和行动,如果北京政权的长臂令国际社会恐惧的结果是全球排斥华裔,中国反抗者的孤立处境之严重程度将超过俄罗斯反对派。

最终的赢家是克里姆林宫和中南海。

这就是为什么要说感动不足以回应。这已经是一个值得思考的问题。仅仅从新闻中就可以读出,北京政权的影响力施展之进度有多快。

经济学人这篇文章揭示了至少在澳大利亚已经被呈现的事实:人们更倾向于站在地缘政治角度上将中国人和北京政权混为一谈,就如美国资金放弃俄罗斯反抗者那样,如果所有美国的盟国都和澳大利亚一样的思考,中国反抗力量将得不到任何帮助。中国政府早已推出了“新反间谍法”将所有与外国组织机构有关联的中国人视为间谍,然而被中国人向往的全球民主国家们如果也排斥中国民间的求助,在孤立反抗者方面,他们将和中国政府达成一致。

最后对中国人说,我们理解很多中国异议的表述所表达的感情,即通过鄙视这个国家整体,而声明自身反对立场的态度。我们无法判断这一表述来自中国异议自身,还是国际上长期混淆“北京政权”和“中国人”的结果。我们只希望更多中国社会真心追求民主的人们能认识到这点,也是我们在《逃离中国》这篇文章中所指出的:逃离不是解决问题的方式,不管是精神上的还是事实上的,如果这个国家不能被改变,北京政权的国际形象将成为所有华裔的身份烙印。改变的希望正来自于那些认识到这个国家的弊端的人们,也就是那些试图“逃离”的人们,我们不希望这一悖论持续,中国社会必需能做出令国际社会刮目相看的反抗努力,才能令本编者按的一系列陈述更为合理。

Our aim in translating this article is to remind the ever-present but deliberately overlooked fact that some Chinese students abroad do have a patriotic but anti-government stance, as this article points out, but this has never been recognized, especially not by the Chinese. The topic has long been conflicted in China, and these students are branded “little pink,” despised by many Chinese and ostracised by local Australians as Communist Party spies, which is why you can’t see them, or can’t see clearly.

A few years ago, a Chinese dissident student studying in Australia said something like this: “The Chinese little pinks on our side has a better understanding than many overseas pro-democrat.” I didn’t understand it then. Later, I learned that the “little pink” was meant for students who loved their home but didn’t agree with the regime.

We can talk about the homeland instead of talking about the political concept of the country. The feelings of the people who are away from home towards the homeland are well known, and there can be no contradiction in the fact that anyone with the most basic sense of morality would despise this evil regime. The government is not equal to the country, patriotism is not equal to loving the government, and citizens can not be kidnapped by the regime, which is basic common sense, but it is difficult to say in China.

We think this article does not fully explain the problem. So we add this in the editor’s note. What is puzzling is that we actually spend a lot of time thinking about whether it is necessary to translate this article, precisely, to ask ourselves whether we have the courage to tell the truth. It is our anxiety that the question has always arisen: whether an article, an idea, is acceptable to the Chinese reader as a basic condition for translating it. However, we also understand that an easily acceptable view of the Chinese reader must already exist within the prevailing established cognition, in other words, less useful for the purposes of broadening one’s horizons and enriching one’s cognition. It is precisely those views that are not easily accepted are the path to information freedom and the engine that stimulates thinking.

“This is my country, but that man is not my president.” Many American citizens would say that, and some of China’s overseas students joined the movement after the constitutional amendment by the Beijing authorities. They put up posters: “Not my president.” These young people are the source of future revolt, and their revolt will be based on a love of the land – “That is my home, and I will not allow evil powers to overrun it”; rather than “That country should be destroyed, it is worthless”. The latter is the consensus of many Chinese immigrants and those who want to immigrate in China. If you can choose, which of these groups do you think is more likely to become the resistance force of the future?

There is no doubt.

Once a friend in the Western media said that we should not vaguely label China and Chinese, or Beijing regime and Chinese. I was moved by the recognition that not all Chinese are regime advocates, but there is still a sense of anti-authoritarianism among the populace. And then I came to realize that this was a serious issue, being moved is not enough to respond.

Psychology calls it block-thinking. Just as the Chinese conflate Washington with American society, left and right, independent civil society organizations and government-sponsored organizations when talking about the United States; Americans also confuse the oppositions with the Kremlin when talking about Russia. This is one of the reasons why we translated ‘the Russian NGO’ article: many large American funders have withdrawn their funds, despite the Russian oppositions fearless efforts and lack of resources. This is an attitude and action built on a geopolitical level. If international fear of the Beijing regime’s long arm results in global exclusion of ethnic Chinese, the isolation of Chinese oppositions will be greater than that of the Russian oppositions.

The eventual winners are the Kremlin and Zhongnanhai.

That is why being moved is not enough. It is already a question worth pondering. Just read in the news how quickly the regime’s influence is being wielded.

The Economist’s article reveals what has been revealed, at least in Australia: people tend to geopolitically conflate the Chinese with the Beijing regime, as US funds abandon Russian oppositions. If all US allies think like Australia, China’s resistance will get no help. The Chinese government has long introduced a new anti-espionage law that treats all Chinese associated with foreign organizations as spies. But global democracies, coveted by the Chinese, will agree with Beijing on isolating the oppositions if they also exclude Chinese citizens from asking for help.

Finally, to the Chinese, we understand the sentiment expressed by many of Chinese dissents: statements of opposition by despising the country as a whole. We cannot judge whether this expression comes from the dissidents themselves or is the result of a long international confusion between the Beijing regime and the Chinese. We only hope that more people in China who are genuinely committed to democracy will realize this, as we pointed out in our article Escape from China: Escape is not the solution, be it mental or factual. If this country cannot be changed, the international image of the regime in Beijing will become an imprint on the identity of all ethnic Chinese. The hope for change is coming from those who realize the country’s ills, those who seek to escape. We do not want this paradox to persist. Chinese society needs to make a revolt effort to impress the international community in order to make this editor’s list of statements more reasonable.

以下是经济学人的文章:

How Chinese students exercise free speech abroad

Students aren’t stooges for the government, says Fran Martin of the University of Melbourne

by The Economist FRAN MARTIN

自2017年初以来,澳大利亚的媒体、政府、学术界和情报界的代言人纷纷对中国的秘密政治影响力进行了猜测,这与澳大利亚政府对北京日益激烈的对抗立场相吻合。在这些关于“中国威胁论”的辩论中,澳大利亚大学的普通中国留学生已成为国家政治焦虑的不幸代罪羔羊。他们被指控为中共的间谍、破坏校园言论自由,以及担任中国政府的遥控兵。

虽然这一切都已经发生,但多年来我一直在进行对中国大学生在澳大利亚留学的社交经历的研究。针对他们的指责令我的调查中所涉及的澳洲华裔学生感到困惑和愤怒。大多数人认为这种说法很奇怪,不公平,而且不可信。最容易被混淆的概念是,通过在课堂上发表政治意见,中国学生正在破坏他人的言论自由。一个学生说,“表达自己的观点不就是言论自由吗,而不是攻击它”。

他说得很好。一小撮案件已经被作为中国学生对言论自由的敌意的证据,其中包括中印边界的地缘政治分歧,台湾和香港应该被描述为国家,讲师暗示,中国学生经常在考试中作弊、中国官员酗酒无度。

但在这些情况下,中国学生都没有试图压制他人的观点。他们不同意他们的讲师,就像学生们每天在全国各地的教室里互相挑战教师和彼此的方式一样。我们普遍欢迎这样的挑战,作为学生独立思考的证据和他们表达反对意见的自信心:自由教育传统中的核心价值观。

学生们互相暗中监视并向阴暗的共产党机构报告的警告同样使我的大多数研究参与者不受欢迎。如果这样的事情发生,这些学生显然没有意识到这点。我认识的中国学生中没有任何一个人与中国学生和学者协会有过重要的联系,该协会常常是领事馆控制学生团体的手段。那些偶尔参加过活动的人报告说,这些活动是没有政治内容的社会和文化活动。

人们会告诉你,中国学生很谨慎同胞之间的政治对话并进行自我审查。但我的经历有所不同。我曾经教过许多涉及台湾政治、中国公民权利、天安门广场抗议活动、香港身份认同、中国民族主义和共产党批评,以及其他所谓的“敏感”话题的中国学生,这些问题并没有出现。中国大陆学生对课内外的小组讨论作出了认真和公开的表示,并对从不同角度研究这些课题表现出浓厚的兴趣。

一些评论家指出中国学生在国外的民族主义,将其等同于对党和政权的毫无疑问的支持。但更深入的研究显示这种现象要复杂得多。我的研究表明,虽然许多人认为在像中国国庆节那样的特殊场合表达爱国主义是“酷”,但这通常并不意味着要对其政府进行全面认可。那些在10月1日把他们的微信个人图片换成中国国旗的学生,或者在道义上有义务捍卫他们的家园声誉,而在其他情况下,他们批评政府滥用权力、侵犯人权、媒体审查或习近平修宪无限期地延长任期等等恶劣行径。

这并不是说中国学生在国外不会自我审查。在一个民族主义猖獗的时代,通常都是通过公民主导的网上对异议的迫害来进行的,但大多数人认为,在重大公共场合诋毁中国或其政府是不明智的。可信的是,少数思想热情高涨或政治雄心勃勃的学生可能会被迫向领事馆和大使馆报告反政府抗议活动的计划,大使馆显然对此有明显兴趣。

但将中国学生整体视为国家安全威胁的最大问题之一是,所谓的激进边缘活动被与对中国学生的公众想象力相关联。令人遗憾的是,听到国内学生和大学工作人员都表示对中国学生不信任,认为他们必须全部都是被政治洗脑的,最多也就是最差的观点是认为他们已经成了共产党的卧底代理人,这已经变得越来越普遍。事实上,澳大利亚的辩论变得如此激烈,还原和极端化,以至于一些中国 – 澳大利亚学者 – 甚至非中国籍的中国学者 – 越来越不愿意质疑中共对校园渗透的语话,他们害怕自己被标记为政权的傀儡。

具有讽刺意味的是,那些声称言论自由和自由主义价值观的人的言辞却导致了冷战时期的妄想和猜疑。由全国79位著名中国学者签署的公开信件对目前辩论的这种反作用效果给予了关注。指控中国学生破坏学术自由显然也会疏远学生本身,面对大规模的公共舆论袭击,他们已经陷入了困境和被动防御。这意味着澳大利亚学术界错失了让这些学生有效参与的机会。

这些学生都是中产阶级和精英阶层的子弟,有可能成国家未来的领导人。他们在澳大利亚、美国和欧洲学习的人数如此之多,这是他们在智力上和社交上参与其中的独特机会。相互尊重的参与可以丰富和改变中国学生对当代世界的理解和在其中的地位,以及我们对“中国崛起”及其与中国关系的理解。由于目前辩论中关键问题被过度简化,不幸的是,这些机会在很大程度上仍未实现。

作者是墨尔本大学文化研究副教授 Fran Martin。她目前正在进行为期五年的ARC未来奖学金项目,以研究中国学生在澳大利亚的经历。⚪️

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